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1. The EU Polity in 3D
The fit between the federal idea and the European Union has always been 
both obvious and awkward. It is obvious because there is so much about the 
European Union that appears to be federal in general character. A familiar and 
widely affirmed general definition of federalism holds it to be ‘the genus of politi-
cal organization that is marked by the combination of shared rule and self-rule’1. 
In terms of that bare test, the European Union appears to qualify emphatically 
as a species of the federal genus. Its 28 Member States, all of whom continue 
to enjoy sovereign statehood in international law, and to that significant extent 
also continue to enjoy self-rule, have nevertheless pooled and so come to share 
substantial powers in various areas of law and public policy at the higher, supra-
national level. Reinforcing the federal pattern, a number of Member States also 
demonstrate a federal or federal-like structure of internal relations, including Ger-
many, the EU’s largest and most influential member, as well as Austria, Belgium, 
Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom. So federalism is a feature of the whole, but 
also of some of the parts.
Yet the European Union is also a very unusual, indeed unique species of 
the federal genus. On the one hand, by far the most common application of the 
federal idea is to the sovereign state. That is to say, the form of ‘political organ-
ization’ to which the federal label normally applies is the territorial state typical 
of the modern age, complete with a division of powers between a common 
government of the whole and geographically discrete internal ‘cantons’, ‘cities’, 
‘provinces’, ‘Länder’ or even (and confusingly) ‘states’. On the other hand, to 
the extent that the ‘f’ root is used with reference to forms of political organization 
other than states, the typical stylization remains ‘confederation’. Confederation 
refers to a pooling or upward delegation of authority by a number of sovereign 
states towards a broader international authority, which is weaker than the centre 
of federal state in several important respects. Unlike the central government of 
the federal state, the confederation tends to be subject to member state veto on 
many issues. Its decisions bind member states but not their citizens directly. It 
lacks an independent fiscal or electoral base; and authority has been not ceded 
to it by the member states finally and irreversibly.
Both models – federal state and confederation – are in the final analysis 
the product of a sovereign state-centred perspective. In the one case (federal 
state), the sovereign state provides the framework for the entire federal relation-
ship, whereas in the other (confederation) it provides the prior and dominant unit 
within the wider relationship. But if, under the sign of state sovereignty, federal 
1  See R. Watts (1998), p. 112. 
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state and confederation are the two main federal types, this leaves the EU in 
an uncharted place2. Lacking the omni-competence of a sovereign state but 
possessing a more autonomous institutional framework and more a more pene-
trative normative reach than a confederation, the EU, at least in the eyes of most 
observers3, conforms to neither of the two most familiar species of the federal 
genus. One way of putting this – albeit little explored – that captures a common 
distinction between the EU and both archetypes is to say that the kind of fed-
eralism with which the EU is associated is three-dimensional (3D) rather than 
the more familiar two dimensional (2D) structure. Both the federal state and the 
confederation imply two–level systems – in the one case the central state (the 
federal government) and its sub-state parts, and in the other the supra-state (the 
confederal institutions) and the (sovereign) state, whereas the EU recognizes 
(and reframes) all three of the levels implicated in this pair of two-level systems – 
supra-state, state and sub-state. 
Hence the awkwardness in applying the federal idea to the EU – an awk-
wardness reflected in the range of labels that have been used in this endeavour. 
The EU has been called ‘quasi-federal’4, a ‘loose federation’5, an example of 
‘partial federalism’6, a case of ‘federalism without a federation’7, ‘a Federation of 
States’8, and a ‘federation d’état-nations’9. To complicate matters further, federal 
theory also tends to lay claim10 to various other descriptors as part of a broad-
er innominate category of federal types, and many such descriptors have also 
been applied to the EU. So where the EU has been described as a Union, 
a league, a Bund 11, ‘a compound democracy’12, a ‘transnational consociation13, 
2  See e.g. the discussion of R. sChütze (2012), p. 2. 
3  Some do revert to the unqualified labels. For Daniel Elazar and for Michael Burgess, for example, the 
EU is simply a ‘confederation’, whereas for Thomas Hueglin and Alain Fenna it is simply a ‘federation’. See 
e.g. M. Burgess (2000); D. Elazar (2008); T. hueglin and A. fenna (2006); and for general discussion, see 
J. law, ‘How Can we Define Federalism?’ (2013). 
4  See e.g. J. mCCormiCk (2011) and D. mCkay (2001). 
5  W. wallaCe (1996), pp. 439-60.
6  J.C. piris (2006), pp. 69-87.
7  E. BomBerg, J.peterson and A. stuBBs (2008).
8  See sChütze n2 above but also at the political level, among others famously by Joskcha Fischer, 
then German Foreign Minister, in his Humboldt speech of 2000,which is seen as catalyst for the 
European constitutional project of that decade. https://www.google.co.uk/webhp?sourceid=chrome-
instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Josjcha+Fischer+confedration.
9  See O. Beaud (2007).
10  See e.g. A. follesdal, Federalism. 
11  M. Avbelj (2011), pp. 818-36.
12  S. faBBrini (2007) and A. glenCross (2009).
13  See e.g. R. dehousse (1998), p. 595.
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a ‘post-Hobbesian non-state’14, a ‘commonwealth’15, a case of ‘constitutional 
pluralism’16, or even as a previously ‘unidentified political object’17, what is ar-
guably being suggested, just as when the nominate-with-modifiers labels are 
invoked, is the way in which the EU imperfectly approximates an existing federal 
type.
But what, if anything, is at stake in this definitional disputation, and what 
are those involved seeking to accomplish? Certainly, if the aim is simply the 
detached one of locating the EU within a typological or taxonomical scheme 
of (federal) polity types, the point and the potential dividend would be unclear. 
Either the candidate labels, -‘f’ word or not, and, if ‘f’, with or without key mod-
ifiers – are merely suggestive of certain important features of the supranational 
body politic but not intended to be mutually exclusive, still less exhaustive in their 
referential scope, in which case there is not much of moment in the choice and 
little worth fighting over. Or the labels are intended as strong descriptions and 
are meant to be mutually exclusive. But in that case the labels claim too much, 
for the proof of distinctiveness demands greater detail and complexity of under-
standing than any mere label is capable of evoking. A purely detached approach 
to understanding the specificity of the EU in such capsule terms, therefore, tends 
towards opposite errors; either towards the easy indulgence of conceptual win-
dow-shopping or towards gratuitous and ultimately sterile disagreement.
Yet a more engaged approach to the question of definition is also available, 
and here the conceptual work matters much more. From an engaged perspec-
tive, the point of labelling is not one of passive taxonomy. The purpose is not sim-
ply to situate the European polity correctly within an inert classificatory scheme. 
Rather, it is to provide an active component in the understanding and ongoing 
construction of the EU project. The justification of such an approach might be 
threefold. In the first place, it might be a matter of technique. Here the federal 
idea offers a kind of epistemic key. It unlocks a rich fund of comparative and 
historical resources on how to do things in the federal way. These may be helpful 
in matters of grand constitutional design, but also in incremental institutional de-
velopment and in legal decision-making more generally18. In the second place, 
the federal idea might possess an expressive significance. It might speak directly 
to the social and political identity of its recipients, conveying or suggesting a 
broader message to the EU’s various audiences, internal and external, about the 
kind of attachments and expectations that are possible and appropriate for its 
14  See P. sChmitter (1996).
15  See e.g. D. N. maCCormiCk (1999).
16  N. walker (2002), pp. 317-59.
17  As described By Jacques Delors in 1985. For discussion, see H. drake (2000), p. 5.
18  See e.g. D. elazar. 
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‘members’, as well as the kinds of attitudes to it and expectations of it that are 
possible and appropriate from the perspective of ‘non-members’. In the third 
place, the federal idea might supply a deeper imaginative resource. It may paint 
in broader brushstrokes, indicating a more expansive philosophical justification 
for and guidance towards a certain type of legal or political arrangement. In 
short, if – as we emphatically should do for a polity which has developed in such 
an exponential manner and following such an unprecedented course – we con-
tinue to view the EU as a work in progress after nearly 60 years, federal thinking 
may speak to us in one or more different registers of engagement. It may speak 
to our know-how and instrumental calculations as constitutional engineers, to 
our affects and sensibilities as actors possessing or seeking to fashion particular 
forms of political belonging and identity, or to our deepest reflections on the art 
of the politically possible and desirable 
Yet while the engaged perspective better explains why the ‘f’ word and its 
associates might be invoked in the 3D environment of the EU, it is a perspective 
that offers uneven rewards and which involves risk as well as opportunity. In this 
paper, I want to consider the mixed virtue of the engaged federal perspective in 
relations to certain key recent developments in the 3D territorial politics of the 
EU. In a nutshell, I want to argue that the invocation of federalism considered 
either as a technique of government or as a direct expression of an affective re-
lationship between people and supranational polity is of limited or even negative 
value in the EU, but that federalism as a basis for imaginative reflection on the 
nature and proper trajectory of an unprecedented political configuration fares 
rather better. Here, indeed, the federal imagination provides a direct challenge 
to the state sovereigntist perspective set out above, but does so with complex, 
unpredictable and as yet unresolved effects given the powerful legacy of that 
sovereigntist perspective. In pursuing this point, I want to focus on a particu-
larly topical and challenging part of the European federal puzzle. I want to con-
centrate on the third sub-state dimension of the EU’s 3D ‘federated’ structure, 
and, in particular, how the development of the EU’s federal imaginative example 
should and can alter the spirit in which new sovereignty claims at this level are 
both made and received.
2. The Limits of EU federalism: technique and affect 
(a) Federalism as governmental technique
Let us start with federalism as technique. What, if anything, does the ‘man-
ual’ of federal government have to offer as a guide to the EU? Even if we limit 
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this inquiry to the 2D context of supranational and national levels, and the rela-
tionship between these two levels, the answer is not very much. The nub of the 
problem is that most thinking about federalism as a technique of institutional 
engineering, unsurprisingly, comes from the familiar context of the federal state. 
A glance at any checklist of the salient institutional features of federalism con-
firms this. Alongside the basic idea of a settled division of legislative competence 
and executive authority between the two levels of government, on such a list 
we would typically find the following; the supremacy of the federal constitution 
as the ‘higher’ source of the allocation of authority and the guarantee that the 
powers of neither level cannot be altered without the consent of that level; a 
supreme or constitutional court mandated to maintain the supremacy of the 
constitution by acting as final federal umpire in the demarcation of competences 
and also by supplying a minimum common standard of rights protection across 
the federation as a whole; some notion of double citizenship and allegiance to 
the two levels and spheres of the polity; the direct applicability of the laws of both 
levels upon these ‘double citizens’; and the institutionalisation of some degree 
of shared rule within the central legislative framework, typically through a bicam-
eral legislature in which the lower house represents the people of the polity as a 
whole and the upper house represents its constituent territorial parts.
If we look at the EU, some of these features are absent, and in these cases 
the federal manual is irrelevant and inappropriate as a guide. Other features are 
present, but in a form that suggests the differences from the federal state manual 
are as instructive as the similarities. To begin with those features that are absent, 
there is no supreme federal constitution in the EU (nor, importantly, would there 
have been one even if the abortive Constitutional Treaty project of 2003-5 had 
been successful, as its pedigree remained one of international law and as it did 
not purport to absorb and replace the backstop constitutional authority – and 
sovereign self-authorisation function – of member states)19. Instead, there are 
separate and, where they tend to overlap, potentially competing claims to pri-
macy on the part of supranational law, operating from Treaty foundations, and 
on the part of member state law, operating from state constitutional foundations. 
It follows from this basic absence of a canonical federal authority that there can 
be no supreme court mandated to maintain federal supremacy. Rather, mirroring 
and reinforcing the basic pluralism of authority, there are separate apex courts 
at EU (i.e. the Court of Justice of the European Union) and state levels, each 
jealously guarding the claim to ultimate authority within their own sphere of com-
petence. This division of competence and of court jurisdiction also applies to the 
19  On this, see e.g. N. walker (2016).
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protection of rights, with the EU Charter of Rights – promulgated in 200020 but 
not given direct legal authority until the Treaty of Lisbon 2009 – limited to those 
matters within EU competence, and so co-existing both with national constitu-
tional rights catalogues and, in a further pluralizing complication, also with the 
older international framework of the Council of Europe Convention and Court of 
Human Rights, to which all members of the EU are required to subscribe and 
which the EU itself is under a standing21 but challenging22 legal obligation to join.
What of these checklist governmental features of which we can find some 
trace in the EU? Though not present at the outset, citizenship of the Union (con-
ceived of as an automatic derivative of member state citizenship), and so dual 
Union-state citizenship, was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht of 1991. Sig-
nificantly, however, while well developed in the civil and social sphere, it remains 
underdeveloped in the political sphere where EU citizens of second member 
states are not allowed to vote for or stand in national elections in member states 
in which they are resident but lack citizenship. For its part, direct applicability 
has been a vital and distinctive (from the international norm) force of EU law from 
the outset, both present in the Treaties and championed in the early case law 
of the Court of Justice. But direct legislation (primarily through Regulations) re-
mains only one institutional option alongside indirect legislation (primarily through 
Directives) requiring implementing measures in the member states. Finally, the 
image of a bicameral legislature has become more discernible in the complex 
institutional mosaic at the European centre, with a gradually strengthened Euro-
pean Parliament representing the European people as a whole, and both the Eu-
ropean Council and the (functionally rotating) Council of Ministers representing 
the state parts. But the image remains both indistinct, blurred by the stubbornly 
low political salience of the European Parliament compared to its member state 
counterparts and complicated; first, by the ‘lower chamber’ European Parlia-
ment’s continued disproportionate representation of small states in a manner 
that is more reminiscent of a regionally sensitive federal ‘upper chamber’; sec-
ondly, by the fragmented and indirectly elected form of the ‘upper chamber’ of 
European Council and Council of Ministers; and, thirdly, by the heavy involve-
ment of the non-elected but increasingly politicised European Commission as a 
‘third chamber’ in the initiation phase of European legislation23.
20  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01).
21  TEU, Article 6(2).
22  See Opinion 2/13 (on accession of the EU to the ECHR), in which the Court ruled the Draft Agreement 
on Accession, itself the result of lengthy political negotiation. To be inconsistent with the broader legal and 
constitutional architecture of the EU.
23  See, e.g. the Spitzenkandidaten initiative of 2014, by which Juncker’s appointment as new 
Commission President was pursuant to his being the nominated candidate of the majority of the newly 
elected European parliament – the first time such a linkage had been made. See e.g. H. mahony (2015).
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The inadequacy of the state federal manual as a technical guide to good 
government in the EU is reinforced if we adopt 3D vision and look, additionally, 
to the relationship between supra-state and sub-state levels. As already noted, 
analysis of the EU in federal terms has traditionally had little to say about this third 
dimension. Reflected in the popularity of labels such as Federation of States’, 
and a ‘federation d’état-nations’, it has tended instead to concentrate on the 2D 
supra-state/state relationship. In some part this has to do with an (understand-
able) intellectual reflex to concentrate on those dimensions which bear a more 
obvious (though still, as we have seen, limited) family resemblance to the norm 
when exploring federal patterns, but it also has much to do with the EU’s own 
historical ‘regional blindness’24 as an agreement between states in which the 
sub-state parts, regardless of how they might be recognised in domestic consti-
tutional arrangements, simply did not register as separate actors. Yet, certainly 
since the institution of the Committee of the Regions almost quarter of a century 
ago, it has no longer been possible to disregard the sub-state dimension within 
the institutional profile of the EU. But, as will see below, the kinds of relationships 
that have developed between Brussels and the regions simply do not map onto 
the kind of technical checklist of federal governance we have been discussing.
(b) Federalism as an expression of political identity
If the language of federal technique fits awkwardly with the EU, the same is 
true of federalism as an expression of the affective relationship between people 
and polity. Again, the root case is the tendency to equate federalism with federal 
statehood. 
European federalism as a self-conscious language of political identity has a 
complex heritage, in its modern EU-relevant form traceable back to the Venta-
tone Convention of 1941, the foundation of the Movimento Federalista Europeo 
two years later, and the inspirational role played by the Italian Eurocommunist 
and one time prisoner of war Alberto Spinelli in both. In this early phase, the 
symbolic meaning of federalism in the fledgling debate about a pan-European 
solution was as much corrective as constructive. It expressed a counterpoint to 
continental war, suggesting an alternative vision of Europe sufficiently integrated 
through common institutions and policies to rule out the prospect of any repeti-
tion of the century’s two global conflicts. 
The subsequent history of the ‘f’ word as an expressive factor in Europe’s 
supranational project before and after the signing of the Treaty of Rome became 
more fragmented. One the one hand, the explicit version originally championed 
24  J. Bengoetxea (2013), p. 235. 
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by Spinelli gained some traction, and in 1984 Spinelli himself (by now an MEP) 
persuaded a majority of the European Parliament to endorse a Draft Treaty on the 
European Union. Spinelli’s vocabulary was not only explicitly federalist, but also 
explicitly constitutionalist in its ambition to supply a popular founding document. 
However, this brand of ‘constitutional federalism’25 both in 1984, and in later 
iterations – notably the Constitutional Treaty Project of 2003-5 – has tended in 
the final analysis to be defeated and to be eclipsed by what is sometimes called 
‘functional federalism’26. Functional federalism follows the alternative integration 
pathway famously set out by Jean Monnet, according to which supranational 
Europe would emerge sector-by-sector in a pattern of piecemeal progression. 
Common cause in the initial project of constructing an area of free trade and free 
movement would create spillover effects that would in time justify integration 
in other areas of social, economic and security policy. Where the ambition of 
constitutional federalism tends to be avowed, event-centred, exponential and 
teleological, therefore, the actual course of functional federalism has tended to 
be implicit, stepwise, incremental and reactive.
In the symbolic politics of European integration, there is no doubt that while 
the ‘low road’ of neo-functionalism has been followed, the ‘high road’ of con-
stitutional federalism’s explicit vision has suffered from its association with ideas 
of federal statehood. While there have been versions of constitutional federalism 
which do, indeed, tend in the direction of statehood, most of its prominent ex-
ponents have in fact emphasized the continuing importance of member state 
sovereignty alongside a more or less ambitious agenda of further integration27. 
Yet, especially from Maastricht onwards, Eurosceptic forces in the UK and else-
where have been very effective in associating use of the ‘f’ word with EU-stat-
ist ambitions, thereby tapping into the fears of those whose political identity 
is closely tied to the nation state and who see a certain type of integrationist 
ambition as an existential threat to the nation state. So entrenched has this 
negative association become, indeed, that even where, in response to the post-
2008 fiscal crisis, there has been an unprecedented new wave of executive-led 
economic integration in the EU, with few exceptions28 those who have been in 
the vanguard of that change, in particular German Chancellor Merkel and French 
Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, have assiduously declined to use the ‘f’ word 
to describe their plans. As one set of commentators put it, today ‘federalism is 
25  See A. Borriello and A. Crespy (2015).
26  Ibid.
27  As with Fischer’s Federation of States, n8 above. 
28  Notably, the erstwhile Commission President Barroso; see ‘Barroso calls for an EU federation’ 
Financial Times, 12 September 2012.
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both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders’ discourse’29. However 
much it may inform or accurately describe developments, in Europe’s contem-
porary identity politics it is an influence or direction that dare not speak its name.
As we shall see, this emphatically does not mean that the EU is incapable 
of influencing the affective relationship between citizens and the polities with 
which they are associated. Indeed, as we come to explore the deeper structure 
of the federal imagination we will show how it assuredly does. All that should be 
claimed is that the direct self-attribution of the federal label by those who speak 
on behalf of the EU has become an increasingly unproductive expressive option 
in the arena of European identity politics.
3. The Federal Imagination
What then of federalism not as a tool-kit of good government in the EU, and 
not as a surface expression of a political form with which people may (or, more 
commonly, may not) identify, but as a deeper imaginative resource and means 
of reflecting on the nature and purpose of our legal and political arrangements in 
a manner oriented towards the more general ‘federal’ possibility of a combined 
order of self-rule and shared rule? Here we encounter more promising terrain. 
Within the European tradition of modern political and public law thought, along-
side the dominant modern state-sovereigntist tradition first fully developed in the 
16th century writings of Jean Bodin, an alternative trail leads back to Johannes 
Althusius, the Calvinist political philosopher of the same era. Whereas the sov-
ereigntist approach emphasized the primacy of the state system internationally 
and the indivisibility and ‘top-down’ pattern of sovereign authority domestically, 
in so doing encouraging the restrictive confederation-federal state duality of con-
ventional federal wisdom, the Althusius approach stressed instead a ‘bottom-up’ 
covenantal view of human society30. According to this view, the political order 
as a whole is a compound association-of-associations established by citizens 
on the basis of their consent-grounded basic communities. In contrast to the 
sovereigntist approach, the image is one of a mosaic connecting different forms 
of community rather than of a unifying hierarchy, of evolved rather than imposed 
order, of an organic process rather than a reified state form. 
The broad federal vision of a combined order of self-rule and shared rule, 
of course, has many and varied historical sources and influences31, and the 
point is not to accord any particular priority to Althusius in accounting for the 
29  See Borriello and Crespy n25 above, p. 504.
30  For discussion, see e.g. D. elazar (2001).
31  Ibid. See also follesdal, n10 above. 
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contemporary influence of federalist thinking in the European supranational con-
text. Rather, it is to stress the long historical significance in Europe of an alterna-
tive projection of modern political society of which Althusius’s thought was both 
reflection and reinforcing cause32, and which has continued in the institutional 
form of many modern European multinational states as well as through the ex-
ample of key global precedents in the USA and elsewhere.
Although its genealogy is again complex and multi-faceted, the introduction 
of the concept of ‘subsidiarity’, which speaks to the same broader aspect of 
the legal and political imagination as does the historical lineage of federalism, 
into the general lexicon of EU law by the Treaty of Maastricht, is also revealingly 
suggestive of this continuity33. The Treaty version of the subsidiarity principle 
holds that other than in those limited areas where it has exclusive competence, 
‘the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or 
at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’34. For present purposes 
what is most telling about this formulation is threefold. In the first place, there is 
the default presumption in favour of the more local level of authority in the ab-
sence of a special justification for central authority, a presumption that chimes 
with the covenantal emphasis on the primacy of the local community. In the sec-
ond place, there is the specification of a graduated or spectral conception of au-
thority – an attribute properly located at variable levels within a multi-layered set 
of possibilities depending on circumstances, rather than categorically assigned 
to one site or another. Again this chimes with the deeper image of federalism, in 
particular the idea of the structure of political authority as a multiform mosaic. In 
turn, this indicates a third and more particular significance. For, with its reference 
to the ‘regional and local level’, the concept of subsidiarity specifically penetrates 
below the level of the state in contemplating a more encompassing federal-style 
conception of layered authority.
4. The EU Federal Imagination in 3D 
How then, in manner which can neither draw on the federal state manual nor 
style itself in explicitly federal terms, does the EU’s treatment of the third level of 
32  Including some of the earliest federations such as the Helvetic Federation (in Switzerland), the Holy 
Roman Empire and the United Netherlands.
33  For discussion, see N. walker (2015). 
34  TEU Art. 5(3).
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sub-state authority specifically draw upon the federal imagination of a combined 
order of self-rule and shared rule?
As noted above, with the passing of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, a Com-
mittee of the Regions emerged as a consultative body to the other institutions. 
Its somewhat marginal early role was improved under the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, 
which requires the Commission, Council and Parliament to consult it on matters 
concerning local or regional government, and which also allows the Committee 
to challenge EU laws that may fall foul of the principle of subsidiarity35. Regions 
also benefit from their legal recognition as regions through access to European 
structural funds administered through their member states, and through rights-
based and anti-discrimination measures that guarantee linguistic and cultural 
protection for minority groups. More generally, the economic and political struc-
ture of a supranational union can provide avenues of opportunity to regions 
not available within the solitary state. Regions now have free access to a com-
munity-wide market of 500 million people, and these open frontiers can help 
promote joint economic activity and encourage cultural connections between 
regions. And alongside this horizontal network of ‘paradiplomacy’36, there are 
also new political ties in the vertical structures of European governance, particu-
larly through the European Free Alliance (of nationalist, regionalist and autono-
mist parties) in the European Parliament and the establishment of the informal 
Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power.
These institutional, regulatory, economic and political forms of encourage-
ment of sub-state autonomy have recently begun to be reflected and reinforced 
at the constitutional level of EU law. Initially, this higher-level recognition was re-
sisted not only due to the political weight of sovereign member weight interests 
in the making of supranational Europe, but also according to the deeper logic of 
international law. The principle of the international autonomy of the state has tra-
ditionally held that the state can organise itself in whichever way it chooses inter-
nally, provided it honours its international obligations. It followed from this that an 
international organisation such as the EU had neither right nor duty to examine, 
supervise or control how states configured themselves internally. A second prin-
ciple of State personality reinforced this first principle by linking title to authority. 
Just as the state is the decisive judge of its own internal relations, in international 
law it is only states, or further entities created by states in the international do-
main, that are recognised as having legal standing in international law. 
35  For an overview, see D. G Internal Policies ‘The Role of National Parliaments in Regional Policy under 
the Treaty of Lisbon’ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/webdav/users/malfons/public/REGI%20
2012/pe438580_en.pdf.
36  See e.g. F. aldeCon and M. keating (1999).
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Gradually, however, this international law-driven orthodoxy of regional blind-
ness in the constitutional structure of the EU has given way to a more active form 
of recognition. In the first place, the Court of Justice, reflecting and reinforcing 
the institutional and other developments set out above, has gradually come to 
accept a degree of constitutional, decisional and financial autonomy on the part 
of regions possessing a certain measure and status of political and administra-
tive self-government. On account of their special position, such self-governing 
regions no longer fall foul of state aid or anti-discrimination rules in matters such 
as the raising of taxes and the payment of agricultural subsidies37. Secondly, 
the Treaty of Lisbon itself has added a clear duty on the part of the EU to re-
spect the national identity of states, with specific reference to their ‘fundamental 
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-govern-
ment’38. Cumulatively, these developments suggest that the meaning of respect 
for the institutional autonomy of states in international law, at least as viewed 
through the lens of EU law, is slowly being turned on its head. Far from actively 
precluding the EU from taking account of how the state organises itself internally, 
the relevant international principle has begun to be construed so as to incorpo-
rate such an expectation39.
5.  The Challenge of sub-state independence movements to the 3D perspec-
tive
The third dimension of EU federalism has assumed a new salience in recent 
years with the development of strong independence movements in Scotland, 
Catalonia, Flanders and other federal or quasi-federal regions of EU member 
states. In Scotland and Catalonia in particular, matters have come to a head. 
A constitutionally validated independence referendum in Scotland last Septem-
ber was narrowly lost (55-45%), while a constitutionally non-validated plebiscite40 
in Catalonia a few weeks later actually favoured independence. Subsequent 
electoral success for independentist parties in May (Scotland) and October 
(Catalonia) of 2015, together with the ‘Brexit’ referendum of June 2016 which 
37  See e.g. Case C 88/03 Portugal v Commission [2006] ECR I-7155; Case C-428/07 Horvath v 
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2009] ECR I-6355.
38  TEU Art. 4(2).
39  Bengoetxea, above n24.
40  On the Spanish Constitutional Court’s refusal to recognize the constitutionality of a referendum in 
2014, see V. ferreres Cornella (2014); see also J. garCía oliVa (2015). 
The Scottish National Party won 56 out of 59 Scottish seats in the May 2015 UK general election, based 
upon 50% of the popular vote.
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advised against continuing EU membership of the wider UK of which Scotland is 
still part, has ensured that the question remains very much live in both places41.
In either case, the question of subsequent membership of the EU by the 
seceding state – the so-called ‘internal enlargement’ question42 – has loomed 
large. The independence movements have been largely pro-EU, and, certainly, 
their popular support has favoured continued EU membership. But the actu-
al course and prospects for a transfer of membership in these unprecedented 
circumstances have remained stubbornly unclear. Should an independent (or 
aspiringly independent) Scotland or Catalonia follow the ordinary Treaty amend-
ment procedure for existing Member States under Article 48 TEU in seeking to 
secure the continuing membership of its citizens? Or should it follow the conven-
tional accession route for aspiring Member States under Article 49? Whichever 
route it followed, would that route imply certain success, or at least its strong 
expectation, and, better still for the supporters of independence, would it entail 
a rapid and seamless acknowledgement of Scotland’s place at the European 
table? Does the Treaty’s horizontal obligations of sincere co-operation and sol-
idarity between Member States, together with the vertical framework of rights 
and responsibilities connecting the EU with its citizens, ground a legal duty on all 
parties to negotiate Scotland or Catalonia’s entry in good faith?43 And will Scot-
land’s position be enhanced if and when Brexit goes ahead and independence 
becomes the only means to secure the continuing EU membership of Scottish 
citizens? Or should new internal states simply take their place at the end of a 
long queue of candidate states from Central Europe and beyond, with no legal 
basis for special treatment or consideration, and no guarantee or even legitimate 
expectation of eventual success? And tied up with these threshold questions, 
on what terms could new internal states expect to negotiate entry? In Scot-
land’s case, the constitutional gravity of the referendum vote together with the 
peculiarities of the UK’s semi-detached membership gave these questions a 
particularly pressing relevance. Could Scotland (as the supporters of independ-
ence wished) seek to rely on UK opt-outs on Schengen, or the Euro – the lat-
ter particularly important in light of the pro-independence campaign’s tenacious 
commitment, against the opposition of the UK Government, to stick with the 
41 In Catalonia, the pro-independence parties won 72 out of 135 seats in the regional election of 
September 25th 2015, which had been presented by them as a ‘de facto’ plebiscite (a ‘de jure’ plebiscite 
having been forbidden under the ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court [n7 above]). The result, however, 
was far from an unambiguous success for the independence camp as they won only 47.7% of the popular 
vote. See e.g. D. gardner (2015). See also garCia oliVa, n39 above.
42  See e.g. N. walker (2016). 
43  On which, see e.g. daVid edward (2012). 
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sterling currency?44 And would Scotland’s prospects of relying on these opt-outs 
disappear if and when the Brexit process was concluded and the UK itself had 
left the EU club?
These ongoing developments undoubtedly provide a profound test of the 
EU’s 3D federal imagination, posing hard questions concerning what difference 
the EU has made, what contribution it can or should continue to make, and what 
(if any) should be its public posture on these matters. Yet this same profound test 
also promises a dividend by enriching our broader thinking about the limits of the 
federal imaginary in a world in which a sovereigntist logic remain a powerful fac-
tor in international relations, and, conversely, about the limits of the sovereigntist 
imaginary in a world in which a federalist logic is becoming more powerful in both 
infra-state and transnational relations. 
The basic challenge can be presented as follows. On the one hand, the EU, 
as we have seen, has helped stimulate the development of third-level regional 
political identity in its supranational context through its gradual and tentative un-
folding of a broader federal vision, and, indeed, if we are to take its broader remit 
as an exercise in post-statist federal thinking seriously, this stimulating influence 
should be approved. On the other hand, that this encouragement should lead, 
by extension, to the articulation and pursuit of new claims in the old state sover-
eigntist register, would seem to challenge, and in one view, contradict, the basic 
premises of such post-statist federal thinking. 
44  See e.g. The Scottish Government’s independence manifesto Scotland’s Future: Your Guide to an 
Independent Scotland (2013) chapter3 http://www.gov.scot/resource/0043/00439021.pdf.
Clarity on these matters would have allowed for a more informed assessment ahead of ‘D’ day by all 
involved in the drawn out constitutional drama – a more considered appraisal of the risks attendant 
upon the choice for or against an independent Scotland. But clarity was not in fact forthcoming. Instead, 
the emergence before the vote of a clear and precise legal picture of the membership prospects of an 
independent Scotland was probably always a naïve hope. There are, after all, no precedents for ‘internal 
enlargement’ of the EU following the separation of an existing member state, no Treaty provisions directly in 
point, and no obvious forum outside of the political process where a definitive statement of the relevant law 
can be supplied or enforced. (See e.g. S. douglas-sCott, 2014.) And even if we were to reach agreement 
on the best understanding of the relevant law, or at least to acknowledge some legal positions as more 
persuasive and widely supported than others, and even if we were to assume there was a forum in which 
the most persuasive version could be definitively pronounced, it is not clear how far that would take us. For 
most plausible interpretations of the relevant law seem in any case only to fill in some of the background 
and leave much to the discretion, negotiating position and even the strategy of conformity of the relevant 
parties. So, for example, the majority of informed opinion may favour the Article 49 route – the bespoke 
accession clause – over Article 48, (See e.g. riChard hoyle, 2014) but whichever is chosen leaves much 
in the way of timing and terms to the negotiation of the Member States and the various supranational 
institutions. Similarly, we may agree that, as a new Member State, an independent Scotland would under 
present Treaty rules be required to commit in principle to membership of the Euro, but as membership 
is conditional on meeting various convergence criteria which are under the (partial) control of the states 
themselves, that still leaves a significant margin of manoeuvre to the new state in the post-accession phase.
(See e.g. andrew sCott, 2012). In a nutshell, then, even if legal clarity had been forthcoming, that would not 
have produced legal certainty of outcome, since the relevant law is concerned much more with process 
and conditional requirements than with final outcomes.
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A forcible statement of the view that such an extension would be self-contra-
dictory, and should be recognised as such by the EU in a clear policy of non-ad-
mission of new internal members, has been put forward by Joseph Weiler in his 
recent interventions on Catalonia and Scotland45. He begins by noting that just 
as national minorities in existing Member States who presently enjoy extensive 
forms of individual and collective freedom have no automatic right to secede as 
a matter of general international law, so, too, the EU in its accession and gen-
eral membership policy should not be expected to indulge the independence 
claims of these un-oppressed sub-state nations. To the contrary, the very ethos 
of integration, reconciliation and continental solidarity that has fed the European 
project from its post-War beginnings should cause the EU, and all those who 
endorse the best understanding of its broadly federalist foundations, to take a 
dim view of any separatist, and so necessarily sovereigntist, impulse that seems 
to betray these founding virtues. From this perspective, therefore, far from hav-
ing a stronger claim than those external candidates who have benefited from the 
EU’s extensive post-Cold War Enlargement, as has often been suggested or as-
sumed by supporters of internal enlargement over (or at least alongside) external 
enlargement, those nations already comfortably nested inside the EU’s Western 
European heartland should be refused a safe supranational haven if they insist 
on the path to independence.
Various counters may be suggested to the Weiler approach. In the first place 
it is in danger of not taking a people’s own view of its preferred collective future 
seriously enough. Whether we are dealing with the Scottish or the Catalan case 
or that of any other national minority, should not more store than Weiler allows 
be set by an aspiring nation’s own sense of what is the constitutionally adequate 
vindication of its desire for collective autonomy? If nothing short of independ-
ence is deemed sufficient from the perspective of the constituency in question 
as an affirmation of shared political identity, it is difficult to see why such a sub-
jective collective aspiration should be summarily dismissed in favour of a sup-
posedly objective standard of adequate individual and collective freedom – one 
that, incidentally, always leaves in successful place another and prior but far from 
necessarily morally superior claim to nation-statehood. The EU, after all, already 
respects these already established sovereign claims within its broader federal 
vision, and it might be argued that this is as much (or as little) a performative 
contradiction as the acceptance of new sovereign claims. 
On the face of it, international law, with its high threshold of a ‘right’ to 
self-determination, serves both to reinforce the Weiler argument, and remind 
45  On Scotland, see Joseph weiler (2015). This piece sparked wider debate on the blog in the week 
before the Scottish referendum. For my own contribution, see N. walker (2015). On Catalonia, see J. h. h. 
weiler (2012).
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us of that same conservative sovereigntist orientation. Its establishment-biased 
concern has always been with the minimum necessary disturbance of the ex-
isting international distribution of sovereign authority rather than the fairest and 
fullest accommodation of self-determination claims. Yet international law today 
is becoming more fluid on this matter than first impressions suggest. There are, 
in fact, competing philosophies bubbling under its doctrinal surface46. The pres-
ent position tends to reflect the Remedial Right or Just Cause theory, according 
to which secession is only justified if some basic injustice stands present and 
uncorrected, such as a historically unconsented annexation, a continuing lack 
of protection of the basic rights and security or economic interests of a region, a 
pattern of systematic group discrimination, or a breach of an existing agreement 
of autonomous self-government or of the protection of distinct collective rights47. 
Yet in a post-colonial age in which international law has gradually come to recog-
nize and support the democratic tide in matters of state formation, this approach 
is increasingly challenged by a more generous Primary Right or Choice theory 
according to which any community which views itself as a distinct national com-
munity and which has a special association with a particular territory possesses 
a claim to sovereign self-determination48. And, in practice, there is evidence of a 
creeping convergence of these positions in the relevant jurisprudence. Since the 
landmark Quebec Secession49 decision of the Canadian Supreme Court some 
jurists have begun to proceduralise the right to self-determination into something 
like a right of a national group ‘to be taken seriously’50 in its efforts to secede 
from an existing state. That is to say, even though there continues to be no 
automatic entitlement absent a standing injustice, the articulation of a desire 
for independence on the part of a sub-state national group, ideally through the 
mechanism of referendum, should be sufficient to trigger a requirement on the 
part of the existing state to negotiate in good faith with the sub-state nation over 
their aspirations for independence. 
But even if, notwithstanding these shifts in general international law and the 
conventional morality of international relations, a special case for the EU as an 
entity possessing and pursuing a unique historical mission to make internal se-
cession unacceptable and unnecessary can be advanced along the lines ad-
vocated by Weiler, it seems unduly dogmatic to use this to justify a rigid policy 
against continued membership of new internal states. There are, after all, other 
46  See e.g. S. manCini (2012), pp. 483-7; A. patten (2002).
47  See e.g. the many works of allen BuChanan (2004); see also w. norman (2006). 
48  See e.g. D. philpott (1995; 1998); wellman (1995); H. Beran (1998).
49  Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217. The emphasis here is again on clarity of legal 
process rather than certainty of outcome, to revert to a distinction drawn at n44 above.
50  See in particular, J. klaBBers (2006); see also C. Bell (2014).
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and rival views of the deeper purpose and distinct regional mission of the Euro-
pean Union, with the emergent 3D federal vision introduced above to the fore. 
The priority given in the Preamble to the TEU to the principle of subsidiarity, the 
deepening significance of EU citizenship as a horizontal relationship amongst 
persons as multi-level Europeans rather than state nationals, the growing insti-
tutional recognition of sub-state identity through the Committee of the Regions 
and various mechanisms of regionally sensitive distribution of supranational 
funds, reflect an alternative and more autonomy-friendly perspective. 
Bu this merely restates the problem. How, if at all, do we reconcile these 
competing ‘stretchings’ of the federal imagination? They offer two quite distinct 
styles of post-state federalism, one protecting a modified form of national sover-
eignty and the other countenancing new sub-state sovereigntist projects? One 
cautious view would hold that the complex balance of reasons on either side, 
together with a prudential concern that the EU not express itself as the decisive 
authority on this matter – a concern closely related to the broader symbolic dan-
gers, discussed above, of an assertive EU becoming typed as a federal state in 
the making – means that, regardless of the ‘right’ answer in political morality, the 
public policy of the EU on accession should surely remain agnostic.
The EU has in fact taken an agnostic approach. The Commission (main-
ly through its Presidency) alone amongst the European institutions has been 
prepared to speak on the matter, but in so doing has said as little as possi-
ble51. Their attitude has been to avoid controversy and deflect responsibility by 
stressing the need to cleave to the existing framework of legal rules and polit-
ical practice as a template of disinterested and deferential process. That is to 
say, their stance has been one of ‘legalism plus’, gesturing to the procedural 
rules, but also to the leeway for the exercise of political discretion on the part 
of the Member States these rules permit, as together supplying the appropriate 
decision pathway, and in so doing excluding themselves from any active influ-
ence over that decision and absolving themselves of any responsibility for it. The 
policy position that emerges from Brussels’ attitude of prudential minimalism 
51  As was Barroso’s repeated tendency when President of the Commission. His warning of the possible 
negative reactions of some Member States, and the dangers this posed to the accession process, was 
most explicitly stated on UK nationwide television in the BBC’s Andrew Marr show on February 17th 
2014, sparking a very lively reaction. For comment, see N. walker (2015). The Commission’s stance was 
somewhat softened later in the year when the then President Elect, Jean-Claude Juncker, remarked that, 
as an internal applicant, a newly independent Scotland, having completed a constitutionally recognized 
secession from the UK, would be deemed already to meet ‘core-EU requirements’ and so, to that very 
limited extent, would be treated as a special and separate case; http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/
top-stories/independence-juncker-sympathetic-to-scotseu-bid-1-3482266. For fuller discussion, see N. 
walker (2015).
Book 1.indb   84 06/01/17   12:14
85
Federalism in 3D: The Reimagination of Political Community in the European 
Union \ Neil Walker
VOLUME I \ n.º 1 \ jan. 2017
I have described elsewhere as one of ‘conservative neutrality’52, in which the 
state-protective orientation of domestic constitutional norms on secession and 
the equally state-centred slant of their own European procedures on accession 
are emphasized and their close adherence promised. In this perspective, the 
EU institutions, already uncomfortable under the heavy contemporary burden 
of unavoidable political judgment in matters as controversial as the sovereign 
debt crisis and (more recently) mass immigration, instead defer in the self-deter-
mination context to a process that inevitably (re)empowers the Member States 
themselves individually and collectively. 
One ironic, and potentially self-defeating, consequence of this, however, is 
that, as substance need not follow form, the EU’s formal deference to domes-
tic constitutional norms permits substantively different outcomes. Scotland, in 
this perspective, has benefited from an increasingly permissive constitutional 
culture in the UK in which the Union state has come to accept the continuing 
right of it parts to self-determine their own future, whereas the Spanish federal 
constitution has remained firmly locked against the politically powerful claims 
for a referendum from its Catalan part. The EU’s acquiescence in the national 
constitutional position on secession in each case implies an acceptance of quite 
different answers to the plebiscitary aspirations of two sub-state nations.
6. Restaging the Federal Imagination
Does this not, however, suggest a scenario in which the pursuit of the fed-
eral imagination to take account of an unprecedented 3D development is simply 
trumped by, and so becomes compromised by the EU’s ideologically-rooted ex-
pressive timidity? Perhaps so, but perhaps, alternatively, neutrality could amount 
to more than this cautious pragmatic reflex. There is, after all, a significant dif-
ference between merely avoiding the question of principle for fear of courting 
political controversy, which seems to have largely characterized the EU’s actual 
approach, and answering the question of principle through a position of con-
sidered neutrality in which, as set out above, the existence of reasonable alter-
native interpretations of the public philosophy of the EU means that it would be 
unwarranted for the EU to take a categorical stance one way or the other. What 
is more, and what is crucial, in any case the EU can contribute and should be 
understood as contributing something other to the Scottish debate, and to that 
of the sovereign aspirations of any European sub-state nation, than the role of 
ethical gatekeeper whose authority is dubious and, if exercised, liable to breed 
52  Ibid., 168-77.
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resentment and bring the authority of the EU itself into disrepute. Considered 
neutrality, in short, need not imply an absence of influence.
How is this so? If the EU’s hands are tied in terms of what it says and does 
here, what it is as a political entity nevertheless has significance for the debate 
on secession. For, crucially, in ways some of which are little remarked but broad-
ly experienced, the EU’s very existence as a developing 3D federal formation 
alters the stakes of political nationalism. In the first place, and in material terms, 
by pooling significant sovereign powers above the state and encouraging new 
forms of recognition below the state the EU demonstrates that the choice be-
tween national independence and continued incorporation in another state is far 
from being an all-or-nothing affair. In particular, as we have seen, and as Weiler 
underlines, by supplying various economic and social rights and measures of 
non-discrimination it offers the kind of cosmopolitan freedom that guarantees 
against the systematic ill treatment of minority nations and nationalism within ex-
isting state forms. In the second place, however, and perhaps more importantly, 
by supplying a new level of political identity (including a new form of citizenship) 
and a new point of reference for interpreting national identity, the EU surely also 
changes the significance of national sovereignty and its alternatives for matters 
of political identity. Here the work of the federal imagination becomes closely 
linked to affective questions of belonging, but does so through a deeper ad-
justment of perspectives rather than through any expressive project of federal 
self-naming on the part of the EU. Just as ‘independence in Europe’, as in the 
Scottish nationalists’ longstanding slogan, conveys a very different meaning and 
sense of collective identity than would, say, the ‘separatism outside Europe’s 
Northern edge’ of a unattached Scotland, so too ‘Britain in Europe’ is much less 
isolationist than without its qualifier (as is currently threatened by those who have 
succeeded in their referendum campaign against continuing British membership 
of the EU continuing British membership of the EU)53, and ‘Scotland-in-Britain-in 
Europe’ suggest a much less subordinate native identity than merely ‘Scotland 
in Britain’.
As the examples imply, the argument here cuts both ways. The protective 
presence of the EU certainly offers a spur to new projects of national sover-
eignty. Yet it also supplies a set of considerations that makes the project of 
new statehood less consequential, and, in the instant Scottish case, provided 
we could trust in continuing UK membership of a continuing EU (both of which 
statuses hang by a precarious thread as we enter 2017) less relevant, arguably 
unnecessary, and in the eyes of some sub-state nationalists at least, ultimately 
redundant. Of course, it is precisely this sense that the EU is materially and 
53  See e.g. S. douglas-sCott (2014). 
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symbolically adept at securing the kinds of guarantees and forms of individual 
dignity and collective recognition whose presence are generously accommodat-
ing of many species of sub-state nationalism and whose absence might other-
wise fuel and justify independentist claims that lies behind Weiler’s insistence 
that the EU should also be explicitly and concretely resistant to new forms of 
legal and political identity divisive of existing Member States. But, in my view, 
the first claim should be allowed to stand or fall on its own merits. The EU, as 
we have seen, simply lacks the legitimizing presence to play a robust directorial 
role in treating the internal secession question, but its background work of ‘stage 
redesign’, so to speak, of reframing how we see and experience the goods of 
political community in ways that are highly relevant to that same question, has 
nevertheless been profound. 
The ‘carrot’ of current membership of an EU that is developing a strong 
post-state federal imagination, therefore, should be its own incentive, without 
the ‘stick’ represented by the raw threat of future exclusion. As we face the pros-
pects of further and more intense pressure from European national movements, 
the supranational case for the accommodation of these sub-state nations within 
the existing pattern of statehood remains better served, and served with less 
prospect of collateral damage to the supranational project itself, by emphasizing 
the space for the expression and realization of national political interests that 
Europe offers in the here and now, rather than by dire warnings of privations to 
come for those that might opt otherwise. 
In the final analysis, the EU cannot avoid receiving ‘old’ state-sovereigntist 
claims regarding the terms and conditions of membership, whether the authors 
of these claims are themselves old or new. What it can provide in response to 
these claims, and in anticipation of all future claims, is twofold. On the one hand, 
it can offer a considered neutrality that is careful not to over-reach its own legit-
imacy as a federal non-state. On the other hand, and more tellingly, it can con-
tinue with its pioneering, federal-imagination-stretching example in a novel 3D 
environment, subtly altering the texture and moderating the significance of such 
sovereigntist claims and so reducing the material or symbolic stakes for those 
who stand on one side or other of the identity struggles that inevitably attend the 
making and remaking of political community. 
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